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Tariff Policy for urban water supply in the Lao PDR
S. Dethoudom and K. Burwell, Lao PDR
Background and introduction
Urban water supply services in the Lao PDR are provided 
by 18 provincial utilities know as Nam Papa State Owned 
Enterprises (NPSEs). These enterprises are expected to 
operate as self sustaining commercial entities but in reality 
this is often not the case for several reasons:
• As state owned enterprises efficiency incentives are 
weak.
• Financial management is constrained by restrictive 
government financial regulations.
• Investment is provided by government through loans 
and grants.
• Income is controlled through political agencies (the 
provincial governors) that have the final say in tariffs.
It is this last item, tariffs, that is considered by many (but 
not all) to be the biggest obstacle to self-sustainability. This 
paper examines the problems and how they are intended to 
be resolved through the introduction of a National Water 
Tariff Policy from the Water Supply Authority (WASA) 
Regulatory Board.
Tariff policy before WASA
Policy framework
Effectively, the Lao PDR did not have a tariff policy before 
the introduction of the WASA approach. Tariffs were very 
often determined on an annual ad-hoc basis with the NPSE 
presenting the Provincial Governor’s office with basic finan-
cial statements (balance sheet and income statement) for the 
previous year and suggesting what tariff structure would be 
required for the following year. All too often the approved 
The decentralised urban water supply sector in the Lao PDR, regulated by the Water Supply Authority (WASA) suffers 
from adverse financial conditions many of which are attributable to an absence of a coherent and transparent tariff policy. 
WASA has developed a National Water Tariff Policy, in accordance with its mandated requirements, based upon the con-
cepts of social fairness, protection of the environment and cost recovery recognising the need for returns on capital and 
affordability. This Tariff Policy was officially established by the Minister for the Ministry of Communication, Transport, 
Post and Construction on 26 April 2004, and approved by the Prime Minister on 7 May 2004. The Policy strives to bal-
ance the needs of the stakeholders in the sector especially the operators and their customers. The adoption of a Tariff 
Policy provides confidence for investors, customers and operators that will provide, in the longer term, a sustainable 
water supply service for all.
tariff would ignore basic financial rules, e.g. depreciation 
would be ignored and the utility may find itself encouraged 
to default on debt service to government, etc., all at the be-
hest of the local administrative authorities to keep the tariff 
low. There was little recognition of the need for revenues 
for capital maintenance. Nor was there any interest in setting 
tariffs to levels that would be attractive for investment. In 
extreme cases the tariffs were determined assuming default by 
government customers placing additional financial burdens 
on those that do pay.
On the positive side, the tariffs are generally set to levels 
that in most cases, but not all, maintain positive cash flows, 
although this is often achieved by defaults on loan and other 
payment obligations.
Development agencies often express their concerns regard-
ing tariffs and the failure to achieve full cost recovery. In 
some cases these concerns are reflected in loan covenants 
requiring the NPSEs to raise tariffs to specified levels. Un-
fortunately, there is little or no clear guidance from these 
institutions as to how they arrive at their recommended 
tariffs; in many cases they are often derived as a result of 
simple discounted cash flow calculations drawn from sub-
project feasibility studies. Although noble in intent such 
responses are little more than ‘knee-jerk’ reactions without 
a clear understanding of the underlying problems of poor 
efficiency and short-term interests.
Tariff structure and implementation
Tariffs structures and rates are set by the NPSEs in the 
manner that was inherited from Nam Papa Lao prior to 
decentralisation, i.e.
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• Domestic tariffs are based upon a rising block system 
(rates increasing as consumption rises, with the first 10 
m3 being charged at the lowest rate). Sometimes the first 
10m3 is charged as a minimum monthly charge whether 
or not it is used.
• Non-domestic tariffs are charged at significantly higher 
rates depending upon the nature of the institution. 
• Foreigners and embassies pay exorbitantly high tariffs 
(nearly twenty times the local domestic rate).
• Connection charges are imposed for new connections 
(although sometimes these are provided for free through 
capital investment programmes)
• Occasionally new customers have to contribute to capital 
investment in order to get the community connected to 
the system.
New tariffs are presented to the general public as a fait 
accompli with little or no justification for any increases other 
than to cite inflationary pressures.
Implications
The past policies and procedures for tariffs have effectively 
starved the NPSEs of much needed operational finances 
and investment capital. All that is maintained is cash flow, 
although often at the expense of depreciation, investment 
and, in several cases, debt default. Several of them can be 
considered as technically insolvent.
Consequently, most of the NPSEs have falling levels 
of service, are unable to meet increasing demand, and are 
unattractive to investors. Several multilateral and bilateral 
development agencies recognised this and thus encouraged 
and supported the development of a Tariff Policy. 
Market failure and the need for a water 
tariff policy
Water supply services do not operate in a perfect market: they 
are local monopolies and water is a single quality product at 
a single price. Regulation, as an alternative to market failure, 
must therefore include a significant input into price control. 
Without any competition on prices, e.g. concession bidding, 
WASA has little option to be actively involved in the tariff 
determination process.
The development of WASA included the adoption of a 
legal instrument known as the ‘WASA Charter’ (prepared in 
2002/3 but not yet enacted at the time of writing this paper) 
setting out the regulatory remit of WASA in detail together 
with the rights and obligations of the principal stakehold-
ers in the sector, namely the NPSEs and their customers. 
One of the provisions specified in this WASA Charter is an 
obligation for the WASA Regulatory Board to prepare and 
approve a Tariff Policy based upon:
• Consumer interest and affordability
• Supplier costs of service provision
• The environment
• National economic policy
The Regulatory Board, however, was not as effective as 
intended and the responsibility for the preparation of the 
Tariff Policy fell to WASA. By May 2004, after a prolonged 
period of discussion and consultation, the Tariff Policy was 
approved by the Prime Minister.
Water Tariff Policy objectives
The primary objective of the Water Tariff Policy is to best 
meet the needs of the major stakeholders, namely:
Customers: to provide the best value level of service that 
can be afforded by promoting maximum efficiency
Operators: To ensure that the financial integrity of the 
operating utility is maintained
The environment: To ensure that water resources are 
exploited at sustainable levels by promoting efficiency in 
the use of water 
National and local treasuries: To reduce or remove the 
economic and financial burden of subsidies
Society: To promote social fairness
International development agencies: To promote eco-
nomic development and poverty alleviation in a sustainable 
and affordable manner.
These needs provide a foundation upon which detailed tariff 
policy can be formulated. It is important to recognise that no 
single tariff policy will satisfy all stakeholders entirely, e.g. 
customers would like lower tariffs whereas higher tariffs may 
be necessary to reduce or remove government subsidies
In trying to meet the demands of these forces, not all pull-
ing in the same direction, the Tariff Policy is structured into 
several categories:
1. Social fairness
2. The environment
3. Cost recovery
4. Capital structure and return on capital
5. Constraints
The Tariff Policy does not specify in every case exactly how 
tariffs should be determined but simply sets the foundations 
for such determinations in the form of guidelines and rec-
ommendations. WASA, as the regulator, is free to interpret 
this policy with a degree of flexibility and discretion to suit 
each individual operator’s circumstances.
Principal components of the policy
Social fairness
Social fairness immediately presents a moral dilemma. Is it 
the role of the water supply operators to be a mechanism of 
wealth re-distribution or is it a government responsibility? 
The policy concludes that in the medium to longer term re-
distribution of wealth should be a government responsibility 
but in the short term the water operators have a role to play. 
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The policy suggests several mechanisms to introduce social 
fairness into the tariff structure:
Uniform tariffs:A primary mechanism available to the 
PNPs is covered in law (PM Decision 37 of 30 September 
1999) in that the NPSEs must employ a uniform tariff 
throughout their areas of supply (see Box 1).
User types: The affordability constraints for commercial 
customers are not as high as they may be for domestic 
Box 1. The case for uniform tariffs
• The economy of scale factor normally provides for the com-
munities where incomes are generally higher. A uniform tariff 
automatically ensures a degree of cross-subsidy from the 
wealthier, larger communities to the poorer, smaller com-
munities
• It protects those communities who, by accident of geography, 
find themselves in the position where the unit cost of water 
supply is very high.
• It dilutes the effects of disproportionately high and low tariffs 
in the same geographical area with adverse inter-community 
effects.
• It offers a degree of price stability.
• The administration of a uniform tariff structure throughout 
the operating entity is simpler and therefore more efficient.
• It is far easier to present costs to potential customers when 
the tariff is known.
customers even though the unit cost of supply may very 
well be cheaper for commercial users. The policy suggests, 
purely for social reasons, that it may be appropriate for these 
commercial customers to pay a higher water tariff than that 
enjoyed by domestic customers.
Non-discrimination against foreign customers: The NPSEs 
often employ a highly discriminatory practice of charging 
disproportionately high tariffs for foreign customers (includ-
ing embassies). Although efficient in raising much needed 
revenue, this policy is not supported for several reasons: it 
gives Vientiane an unfair advantage due to the high number 
of foreigners there, it allows wealthy Lao citizens to benefit 
from low tariffs, it is unfair on low income foreign custom-
ers and it discourages foreign investment. The Tariff Policy 
recommends that this practice be phased out over time.
Elimination of rising block tariffs: The rising block tariff 
structure is not supported, largely as a result of its ineffi-
ciency as a social re-distribution of wealth mechanism (see 
Box 2). The Tariff Policy, however, does allow its use to be 
continued in the short term pending further investigations 
into its appropriateness.
Elimination of fixed charges and connection fees: The 
practices of fixed charges and connection fees are not sup-
ported. They are contrary to the interest of the poor. The 
Tariff Policy recommends that fixed charges should not be 
applied and connection fees should be subsidised by a higher 
volumetric unit tariff.
Fairness with capital contributions from customers: 
Demanding capital contributions for investment from some 
consumers whereas others are not obliged to is considered 
unfair. Such contributions should not be demanded unless 
those that contribute towards capital investment are rewarded 
with a reduced tariff.
Tariffs to reflect levels of service: If a group of customers 
elect to have a lower level of service than others, e.g. stand-
pipes, this should be reflected in a lower tariff, irrespective 
of the costs of service provision
The environment
The Tariff Policy does not support the employment of 
tariffs as a mechanism to reduce water consumption as the 
environmental impact of water abstraction in the Lao PDR 
is small.
Similarly leakage control has virtually no measurable 
environmental benefit and as such any activities in this area 
need to be justified on financial viability only.
Cost recovery
Cost recovery is a major consideration when determining 
tariffs and is essential if the NPSEs are to maintain a sustain-
able service in the long term. Cost recovery is more than 
simply meeting basic operational costs but covers a wide 
range of factors.
Long term approach: The Tariff Policy considers cost 
recovery to be achieved in the longer-term as opposed to 
seeking full cost recovery each year. This ensures that con-
sumers are not burdened with high depreciation and other 
non-consumption related costs in the early years when the 
Box 2. The case against rising block tariff structures
The Tariff Policy discourages the use of the rising block tariff 
structure as being an inefficient mechanism for the re-distribu-
tion of wealth:
• All customers, irrespective of income, receive the benefit 
of the reduced tariff. In fact the wealthier customers whose 
consumption exceeds the lifeline threshold receive the 
maximum benefit whereas poorer customers may receive 
less benefit.
• Shared water supply facilities, generally by the poor, receive 
substantially less benefit per family than individually owned 
facilities.
• The administration costs of rising block tariffs add to overall 
inefficiency.
• It discourages investment in those areas where demand is 
low (poorer communities) and therefore less profitable.
• The generally recognised low level of price elasticity of de-
mand for water suggests that this practice has only limited 
impact on demand.
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system expansion. The regulator is responsible for determin-
ing what a fair return on equity is recognising the variations 
in the operating environment.
Constraints
The two main constraints to tariffs are affordability (an up-
per boundary constraint), and cash flow (a lower boundary 
constraint).
Affordability: Based upon internationally recognised 
norms the Tariff Policy suggests that tariffs be set to levels 
not exceeding 3-5% of disposable household income (3% 
for average and 5% for the poorest sector). These figures 
can be adjusted in the light of data realised from research 
such as contingent valuation studies.
Cash flow: The cash flow positions of the various NPSEs 
are weakened by the failure of government customers to 
pay their dues on time. The Tariff Policy does not support 
higher tariffs for domestic customers to counter the inability 
or unwillingness of government customers to pay. However, 
even with prompt payment by government customers the 
suppliers may still suffer from adverse cash flows, especially 
in the years immediately following major capital investment 
projects. The Tariff Policy does allow tariff adjustments to 
ensure adequate cash flow.
Process
The Tariff Policy sets out a framework for implementation 
based upon a regulatory reporting process, tariff reviews, 
draft determinations, public consultation, final determina-
tions, approval and adoption by the NPSEs.
The time between tariff reviews is left to WASA interpre-
tation. WASA has determined that a period of three years 
is appropriate with interim automatic tariff adjustments in 
line with inflation plus or minus allowances for other factors 
such as efficiency expectations.
Lessons learned
The primary lesson learned from the experience of WASA 
is that the Tariff Policy must be owned by the Regulator (or 
its supervisory institution). During the consultation process 
several powerful interest groups, e.g. multilateral lending 
agencies, attempted to influence specific policy outcomes 
in order to protect their positions, sometimes contrary to the 
wider interests of WASA. Although a broad consultation 
process is encouraged it must not allow specific interest 
groups to dominate the policy objectives to the detriment 
of other less powerful groups, e.g. the customers.
The debate, analysis and consultation undertaken during 
the preparation of the Tariff Policy highlighted the impor-
tance of taking a holistic approach. Social, environmental 
and financial objectives all impact upon each other and it is 
therefore inappropriate for any single policy decision to be 
made in isolation of other decisions.
A well structured tariff policy is not only necessary for 
financial and social stability but it also provides the sector 
with a foundation that promotes longer term confidence for 
future development and investment.
customer base is small. The tariff calculation method is rec-
ommended to be based upon a discounted long run average 
cost (LRAC) technique.
Efficiency expectations: Although direct operating costs 
should be recovered in full the Tariff Policy suggests that 
allowances for expected efficiency improvements should be 
incorporated in the calculation process. Where appropriate 
the employment of comparative competition should be used 
to help set efficiency targets.
Capital investment cost recovery: The capital investment 
profiles incorporated in the Tariff Policy should reflect the 
long-term asset management plans. Capital investment cost 
recovery is through depreciation carried through to the tariff 
(adjusted for the long-term approach). However, in order to 
ensure sufficient funds for the replacement of assets (capital 
maintenance), these allowances need to be regularly (annu-
ally) adjusted for inflation. This requires depreciation to be 
calculated on a current cost basis for the purposes of pricing, 
but still retaining the official rules for tax and government 
auditing purposes.
Capital structure and return on capital
Investment in the water sector is normally financed by a 
combination of government equity (85%) and government 
debt (15%) (except for Nam Papa Vientiane, 50% debt 
and 50% equity). However, inflation, depreciation, loan 
grace periods and long-term repayment periods all work to 
increase the debt burden relative to equity over time. This 
is alleviated, slightly by the current practice, supported by 
the Tariff Policy, of central government absorbing foreign 
exchange risk by converting hard currency donor funding 
into local currency grants and loans. 
Where the government provides grant finance the Tariff 
Policy suggests that the short-term nature of grants be 
converted into a longer-term tariff benefit accepting that 
access to grant finance will reduce over time as the economy 
develops (see Figure 1).
Not only does the Tariff Policy accept the need to include 
the return on debt in the tariff determination process but it 
also recognises the need for a real positive return on equity 
(at least in the longer term) to finance debt repayment and 
Figure 1. Conversion of grant to longer run  
tariff benefit
Source: WASA Regulatory Board Tariff Policy, 2004
Tariff
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